Motogp Monopoly
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MARC MARQUEZ INDIANAPOLIS MOTOR SPEEDWAY COhN EDWARDS
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Why is Marc Marquez able to do things others cannot?
Kevin Cameron
At Indianapolis Motor Speedway, Marc Marquez made it 10 wins in a row. After having "some moments" in early laps, he gave early leader Valentino Rossi a try on lap five, but Rossi riposted strongly. Thereafter, Marquez waited for his front tire to become more consistent, repeated his attack on lap 10, and this time got away to win by 1.8 seconds.
What is this new phenomenon, an apparently invulnerable rider/machine combination? Although Marquez expressed confidence Saturday that he could win on Sunday, in press conferences, he often says he thinks, “Will this be the race in which I cannot win?” So he does what all successful riders do: He does what he can.
One week later at Brno, Dani Pedrosa, Jorge Lorenzo, and Rossi pushed Marquez off the podium for the first time this season. “MotoGP is like this,” Rossi said. “If you are not able to be at too
percent, or maybe you have some small problem with the setting, you arrive behind.” Last year, when Marquez became MotoGP champ at his first attempt, it was clear that he was a skilled manager of tire condition, as lap times in several races showed that his “tire drop” (slowing of lap time caused by physical changes in the rubber) occurred later than it did for his leading competitors, Lorenzo and Rossi. This is probably a result of his two years in Moto2, a spec class whose lack of the usual variables compels the rider to seek any possible advantage.
We can see that Marquez employs unusually high lean angle at the apex, where he drops down off the inside of his bike to place one elbow on the pavement. At such high angle, the traditional “knee on the pavement” is a handicap, so the inside knee is pulled up against the side of the bike for clearance. This is not just a case of “leaning ’er over” more but through the flexibility of the tire’s edge allows more rapid turning of the bike. This results in what Cal Crutchlow called, “Honda’s V-shaped line.” This zone of high lean is also a zone of faster turning, the apex of the “V.” On corner entry, Marquez brakes late and hard, lifting the rear tire off the pavement. He begins the turn by smoothly swinging the rear of the bike outward then sets it down at an angle that compels it to slide immediately and obviously then uses the throttle through the corner to keep that slide going. All this requires great stability and predictability from the machine. The fact that Marquez’s Repsol Honda teammate, Dani Pedrosa, is doing this as well indicates this is a technical development
and not a crude result of rider hot blood and supercharged endocrine secretions.
Marquez said to me in April at Circuit of The Americas, “I am always at the limit,” but note that he falls only in practice, never in a race. No one wins to in a row by systematically accepting more risk than the others. Ten races won is roughly 3,000 corners
without an error that cannot be “gathered up.” This means Marquez is able to do things the others are not.
Honda caught up with Yamaha in 2010, putting aside its tradition of handling defeated by horsepower in favor of a broad frontal attack on instability. Before mid-2010, Pedrosa’s Honda was fast but nervous—always at
“ON CORNER ENTRY, MARQUEZ BRAKES LATE AND HARD, LIFTING THE REAR TIRE OFF THE PAVEMENT. HE BEGINS THE TURN BY SMOOTHLY SWINGING THE REAR OF THE BIKE OUTWARD THEN SETS IT DOWN ATAN ANGLE THAT COMPELS IT TO SLIDE IMMEDIATELY AND OBVIOUSLY THEN USES THE THROTTLE THROUGH THE CORNER TO KEEP THAT SLIDE GOING.”
the edge of control. One element in this work was the reduction of upshift/downshift disturbances by development of a seamlessshift transmission. Proof that this was not central to success can be seen in corner entry today: The Hondas can lift their back wheels controllably and can even be steered to a degree on one wheel. At Indianapolis, Lorenzo’s Yamaha swung from side to side as he braked, and those of the Espargaro brothers, Aleix and Pol, jerked sideways and oscillated, warning them to lay off the hard braking. Lorenzo often refers to the braking stabil-
ity of the Hondas, which is his way of reminding Yamaha that this shortfall must be made good if their results are to improve.
Why do Yamaha and Ducati not simply reply in kind with their own stability programs? Not only is it expensive to put engineers on such programs, but for companies with limited resources, taking engineers off commercially essential new product development (a form of corporate suicide) is the only way this can be done. For this reason, some observers believe Honda will continue to pull away from the others as long as the rules
remain as they are.
Remember CRTs? At one time, Dorna CEO Carmelo Ezpeleta stated that in two years, all teams would be racing such machines— so-called “prototype” chassis (ioo,ooo-euro German or Swiss weldments) powered by production-based engines (Superbike cast-offs or kit engines). The term “CRT” arose from an early proposal of a claiming rule, hence “Claiming Rule Teams.” The resulting bikes were an embarrassment, being typically four to to seconds slower per lap than the leader and slower by far than actual Superbikes, which employ
HEARING HONDA
At Cycle World’s annual Indianapolis Industry Panel, four-time BOOcc GP title runner-up Randy Mamola described listening to the Repsol Hondas of Marc Marquez and Dani Pedrosa at one of Catalunya’s long 180-degree turns. As soon as one of the machines would reach a steady throttle state, its engine note would switch from the higher pitch of a V-4 to the deeper tone of a triple. When the rider moved the throttle to accelerate, the engine would revert to four cylinders.
This is a fuel-saving scheme. With factory bikes limited to 20 liters of fuel, savings at part throttle can be applied elsewhere to increase acceleration. At small throttle, fuel consumption of spark-ignition engines rises as a result of “pumping loss,” the power required to pull intake vacuum in the cylinders.
Hybrid cars gain mileage by switching to their electric motors at small throttle. Honda achieves a similar result, but switching from four cylinders to three at constant power requires a greater throttle opening, reducing pumping loss. Other savings may be realized because only three piston rings instead of four are sealing pressure. -Kevin Cameron
production-based chassis as well as engines. What this revealed was important: Real research and understanding are necessary to build fast bikes, both of which are out of reach of private teams.
Under pressure to provide alternatives to the CRT fiasco, the Big Three responded, and Dorna created a new “Open” category, whose entrants would receive a special softer rear tire. Honda produced for sale a limited number of “production bikes,” basically RC213V V-4S with cam profiles softened to allow operation with metal rather than pneumatic valve springs. As a result, Honda has no fear that a hot rider on its production bike could ever make trouble for Marquez or Pedrosa. Yamaha, unwilling to sell its technology, proposed leasing engines so that teams could slot them into the usual Kalex or Suter chassis. This evidently was a disappointment, so Yamaha has
provided complete 2013 factory bikes, under factory control, probably with software that ensures none of them will take points from high-priced factory riders. Ducati is supplying more bikes to satellite teams.
As a result of these changes, CRTs are no more, and it is finally clear to Dorna that homebuilders and grassroots inventors are not about to unleash a torrent of innovation. The future of the
motorcycle is solidly in the hands of factory R&D programs.
Dorna seeks to rein in Honda with a rev limit and spec software. HRC VP Shuhei Nakamoto vows Honda will quit the series if either measure is adopted. Meanwhile, racing’s usual attraction— the suspense of who will win—is replaced by the temporary novelty of Marquez’s near-total domination. As a business plan for MotoGP, that cannot last.
